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This study aims to examine whether co-opted directors influence analysts’ recommendations. As information intermediaries, financial analysts should incorporate the quality of corporate governance into their valuation because well-governed firms are associated with lower agency costs and better performance. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent chief executive officer assumes office. The authors investigate whether board co-option has an effect on analyst recommendations.

The present study uses univariate analysis, multi-variate regression analysis and conduct a natural experiment using the Sarbanes-Oxley as an exogenous shock.

The results show that firms with fewer co-opted directors tend to receive more favorable recommendations, suggesting that analysts favor firms with strong corporate governance. The results hold even after controlling for various firm characteristics, including the traditional measures of board quality, i.e. board size and independent directors.

The paper is the first of its kind and offers evidence on the effect of co-opted directors on analyst recommendations. The results contribute to the literature both in corporate governance and in financial intermediaries, where analysts play a crucial role in providing information to the various participants in financial markets.

Taking advantage of distinctive text-based measures of climate policy uncertainty and firm-specific exposure to climate change, this study aims to examine the impact of firm-specific vulnerability on dividend policy.

To mitigate endogeneity, the authors apply an instrumental-variable analysis based on climate policy uncertainty as well as use additional analysis using propensity score matching and entropy balancing.

The authors show that an increase in climate policy uncertainty exacerbates firm-specific exposure considerably. Exploiting climate policy uncertainty to generate exogenous variation in firm-specific exposure, the authors demonstrate that companies more susceptible to climate change are significantly less likely to pay dividends and those that do pay dividends pay significantly smaller dividends. For instance, a rise in firm-specific exposure by one standard deviation weakens the propensity to pay dividends by 5.11%. Climate policy uncertainty originates at the national level, beyond the control of individual firms and is thus plausibly exogenous, making endogeneity less likely.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first attempt in the literature to investigate the effect of firm-specific exposure on dividend policy using a rigorous empirical framework that is less vulnerable to endogeneity and is more likely to show a causal influence, rather than a mere correlation.

The purpose of this study is to shed light on the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on asset redeployability. Capitalizing on a novel measure of asset redeployability, the authors explore the effect of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on redeployable assets using a unique text-based measure of EPU. Asset redeployability is an important aspect of sustainability that has been largely overlooked. More redeployable assets can be repurposed for a variety of uses, lessening the necessity for new products and thus conserving natural resources.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, the authors execute a variety of robustness checks, i.e. propensity score matching, entropy balancing, instrumental-variable analysis, GMM dynamic panel data analysis and use Oster’s (2019) approach for testing coefficient stability. Importantly, the authors incorporate firm fixed effects in the analysis, which helps mitigate endogeneity due to unobservable firm characteristics.

Based on an immense sample of over 200,000 observations over three decades, the results reveal that greater uncertainty raises asset redeployability significantly. The findings corroborate the managerial prudence hypothesis. The future deployment of assets is less predictable in times of increased uncertainty. Consequently, during uncertain times, it is more prudent to have assets that can be redeployed for multiple purposes.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to explore the impact of EPU on asset redeployability, which is a critical aspect of sustainability that has rarely been investigated in the literature. The authors fill this important void in the literature. The authors extend the literature in EPU, asset redeployability as well as sustainability.

Exploiting a unique measure of hostile takeover exposure principally based on the staggered adoption of state legislations, the authors investigate how external audit quality is influenced by the discipline of the takeover market. External auditors and the takeover market both function as important instruments of external corporate governance.

The authors execute a standard regression analysis and run a variety of robustness checks to minimize endogeneity, namely, propensity score matching (PSM), entropy balancing, an instrumental-variable analysis, Generalized method of moment (GMM) dynamic panel data analysis and Lewbel's (2012) heteroscedastic identification.

The authors’ immense sample spans half a century, encompassing nearly 180,000 observations and 17 takeover-related state legislations, one of the largest samples in the literature in this area. The authors’ results suggest that firms with more takeover exposure are significantly less likely to use Big N auditors. Therefore, a more active takeover market results in poorer external audit quality, corroborating the substitution hypothesis. The discipline of the takeover market substitutes for the necessity for a high-quality external auditor. Specifically, a rise in takeover susceptibility by one standard deviation lowers the probability of using a Big N auditor by 4.29%.

The authors’ study is the first to examine the effect of the takeover over market on audit quality using a novel measure of hostile takeover susceptibility mainly based on the staggered implementation of state legislation. Because the enactment of state legislation is beyond the control of any firm individually, it is plausibly exogenous. The authors’ results therefore probably reflect a causal influence rather than merely a correlation.

Exploiting an innovative measure of corporate culture based on machine learning and earnings conference calls, this study aims to investigate how corporate culture is influenced by hostile takeover threats. To sidestep endogeneity, this study uses a unique measure of takeover vulnerability principally based on the staggered implementation of state legislations, which are plausibly exogenous.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, this study also executes a variety of other empirical tests such as propensity score matching, entropy balancing and an instrumental variable analysis, to demonstrate that the results are robust. The final sample includes 27,663 firm-year observations from 4,092 distinct companies from 2001 to 2014.

This study documents that more takeover exposure weakens corporate culture considerably, consistent with the managerial myopia hypothesis. Threatened by the takeover risk, managers tend to behave myopically and are less likely to make long-term investments that promote strong corporate culture in the long run. Additional analysis focusing on a culture of innovation, which is especially vulnerable to managerial myopia, produces similar evidence.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to explore the effect of takeover susceptibility on corporate culture using a distinctive metric of corporate culture based on textual analysis.